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THE SUMMER ScHooL-The plans for the 1928 Summer Session
of the University of North Carolina School of Law have been com-
pleted. The first term will begin June 13 and end July 21. The
second term will begin July 23 and will end August 29. The faculty
for the first term will consist of Mr. Justice Brogden, of the Supreme
Court, who will teach the subject of Code Procedure; Professor
Edmund M. Morgan, of the Harvard Law School, who will teach the
subject of Evidence; Associate Professor Wesley A. Sturges, of the
Yale Law School, whose subject will be Credit Transactions, dealing
largely with the law of Conditional Sales, Suretyship and Bank-
ruptcy; Professor M. S. Breckenridge, of the regular faculty, whose
subject is Agency, and Dean McCormick, of the regular faculty, who
will teach Personal Property, including Bailments. In the second
term, Mr. Justice Connor, of the Supreme Court, will have the sub-
ject of Constitutional Law; Professor Morgan will continue the
subject of Evidence, and Professor James Lewis Parks, the author
of the American Case-Book Series "Cases on Mortgages," will teach
[299 ]
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that subject; Professor Wettach, of the regular faculty, will teach
Torts; and Professor Coates, of the regular faculty, the subject of
Criminal Law.
The general plan of the Summer School follows that which was
adopted in the unusually successful summer school which was given
in the Law School last summer. One-third of a year's work may be
covered in the summer, and if a student begins the study of law in
the Summer School, he can complete the work for his degree in a
little over two years by attending the law school continuously.
The requirements for admission are the same in the summer as
in the regular session, except that members of the bar who do not
wish to receive credit toward a degree will be admitted without
restriction. Opportunity for supervised reading in preparation for
the bar examination in August will be afforded.
NOTES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WORTHLESS CHECK STATUTES
In the recent case of State v. Yarboro,l the defendant gave a
check in payment for professional services rendered in the past. He
had no money on deposit and no understanding or arrangement with
the bank for the payment of this check. He was convicted of a mis-
demeanor under a statute which provided that,
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to draw, make,
utter or issue and deliver to another, any check or draft .
knowing at the time of making, drawing, uttering, issuing, and de-
livering . . . that the maker or drawer thereof has not sufficient
funds . . . or credit . . . with which to pay the same
upon presentation (Pub. Laws 1927, ch. 62).
A motion in arrest of judgment was granted, and the state ap-
pealed. A divided court held the statute valid as not in contravention
of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
During the formative period of primitive society when the credi-
tor's rights came to be recognized, there seem to be no limits which
the law set upon them. If he is entitled to the debt at all, he is
entitled to seize the goods of the debtor; and if the debtor has no
goods, he is entitled to his services, which entailed the possession of
his person, including his wife, his children and his slaves, and the
right extended even to power over his life. The creditor was in fact
' 194 N. C. 498, 140 S. E. 216 (1927). /
NOTES
the master of the life and liberty of his debtor. 2 But as early as 326
B.C. the Lex Poetelia3 alleviated the condition of the debtors to the
extent of preventing their summary imprisonment, and thus abol-
ished enslavement of debtors for the future. 4 By the Statute of
Merchants, enacted by the English Parliament in 1282, the creditor
was allowed upon proving the obligation to seize the person of his
debtor and commit him to the Tower. This practice flourished5 until
a statute of 1838 afforded partial relief,6 but it was not until 1868
that the system was finally abolished.7
Likewise the practice of imprisoning the debtor to enforce pay-
ment of debts has prevailed in America, but to a more limited extent.
At the present time it is generally abolished by constitution and
statute, except when there is an element of fraud.
The early American State constitutions took the first step in this
direction by providing that except in cases of fraud the body of the
debtor shall not be confined in prison after delivering up his estate
for the use of his creditors.8 Under this provision when a creditor
had a legal demand against a debtor, he was first required to estab-
2 By the Twelve Tables (Roman Law) the creditors might cut the body of
their debtor into pieces and share it among themselves pro rata. Holmes, The
Common Law, p. 14; Hadley, Introduction to Roman Law, Lect. 10.
'Cicero, De Rep., 2. 34. 59; Arnold, History of Rome, Vol. 2, c. 32. Buck-
land, A Manuel of Roman Private Law, p. 259. However, this law affected
only contract debtors and not judgment debtors.
" The Mosaic laws of debt are interesting as indicative of the state of
society to which they belong and as combining a degree of leniency and severity
which is foreign to our law. A poor Israelite could be sold by his creditor to
one of means, but he served as a hired servant, not as a bond slave, and was set
at liberty when the year of jubilee arrived. (Lev. xxv. 39.) If pledges such as
raiment were given for debt, it must be returned at nightfall if necessary for
covering; and a widow's garments could not be taken in pledge. (Ex. xxii, 26,
27.) However, children were often pledged (Job xxiv. 9) and even given into
slavery, in payment for debt. (2 Kings iv, 1.) But if an Israelite became poor,
it was a duty to lend to him, and no interest was to be exacted either in money
or in produce. When the sabbatical year arrived, i.e., at the end of every
seven years, there was a general remission of debts as between Israelites, and
the near approach of the year of remission was not recognized as an excuse
for declining to lend to an indigent brother. (Deut. xv. 1-11.)
'For the 18 months prior to the commercial panic of 1825, 101,000 writs of
debt were issued by the English courts. In 1827 nearly 6,000 persons were
committed in London alone for debt. Walpole, History of England from 1815,
Vol. 4, c. 17; Harper, Book of Facts, "debtors."
"May, Constitutional History of England (Widdleton's Ed.), Vol. 2, pp.
267-268.
' Statutes, 32 & 33 Vict c. 62.
'Constitutions of: N. C., § 39 (1776) ; Pa., Art. ix, § 16 (1792) ; Ky., Art.
xii, § 17 (1792) ; Tenn., Art. iv, § 18 (1796) ; Ga., Art. iv, § 7 (1798) ; Miss.,
Art. i, § 18 (1817) ; Ala., Art. i, § 18 (1819) ; R. I., Art. i, § 11 (1842); N. J.,
Art. i, § 17 (1844) ; Tex., Art. i, § 15 (1845).
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lish it at law by a judgment, and then have a fieri facias issued
thereon. If this writ was returned, nulla bona, the law provided a
further remedy in the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum which impris-
oned the debtor to compel him to apply in satisfaction of his debts
property which could not be reached by fi. fa.9 Under this section
the debtor having delivered up his property for the use of his
creditors or taken the oath of insolvency was released from impris-
onment.' 0
This writ, however, did not lie at common law against certain
privileged persons," and its application to the masses was partly
relieved of its severity and rigor by the leniency and common sense
of the courts. 12
To obviate the evil incident to the writ of ca. sa. the majority of
American State constitutions finally provided in substance: there
shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud.l 8 This
provision is self-explanatory. Not all imprisonment is prohibited;
only that for debt, arising ex contractu, and without fraud.14 But
the exception, allowing full latitude for the enforcement of the fraud
statutes, does not destroy the prohibition. It does not permit impris-
onment through the operation of the criminal law by making it a
crime to fail in paying a debt.
No difficulty arises where the act is tainted with fraud, for in
such cases the act is expressly taken out of the protection of the
constitution. 15 The American States are seemingly unanimous in
'Powell v. Howell, 63 N. C. 283 (1868).
SoP. L. 1773, c. 4; Burton v. Dickens, 7 N. C. 103 (1819) ; Jordan v. James,
10 N. C. 110 (1824); S. i. Manuel, 20 N. C. 144, 153 (1838); Williams v.
Floyd, 27 N. C. 649 (1845).
Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. 3, p. 414.
1 Inst. 289, where a defendant in 13 Edw. III was discharged from such
a capias because he was of so advanced an age and could not endure imprison-
ment.
The only states not having a similar constitutional provision are: Conn.,
Del., La., Mass., Md., Me., N. H., N. Y., Va., Vt., and W. Va.
1
,Imprisonment for debt: 1 N. C. L. Rev. 229 (1923). It has no applica-
tion to debt arising ex delicto: Long v. McLean, 88 N. C. 3 (1883) ; Stidham
v. Du Bose, 128 S. C. 318, 121 S. E. 791 (1924); S. v. Dowling, 110 So. 522
(Fla. 1926). Fraud must be alleged and proved: Claflin & Co. v. Underwood,
75 N. C. 485 (1876), Stewart v. Bryan, 121 N. C. 46, 28 S. E. 18 (1897) ; Led-
ford v. Emerson, 143 N. C. 527, 55 S. E. 969, 10 L. R. A. (n. s.) 362 (1888).
"Cases not within prohibition against imprisonment for debt:
Refusing to pay alimony: Barclay v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 375, 56 N. E. 636, 51
L. R. A. 351 (1900) ; Lamar v. Lamar, 123 Ga. 821, 51 S. E. 763, 107 Am. St.
Rep. 169, 3 Ann. Cas. 294 (1905) ; Ex parte Davis, 101 Tex. 607, 111 S. W.
394, 17 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1140, and note (1908).
Non-support of wife: S. v. Dixon, 138 Tenn. 195, 196 S. W. 486 (1917)
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condemning the obtaining of property by false pretenses and cheats. 16
Under this general classification appear the fore-runners of the pres-
ent bad check laws, which were aimed at the practice of securing
property by deception. 17 Consequently the sine qua non of crimi-
nality under this type of statute is (1) fraudulent intent' 8 and (2)
obtaining presently something of value.' 9 The constitutionality of
this legislation depends upon the provision requiring proof of fraud,
and where the statute does not require fraud,20 or where fraud is
presumed without allowing testimony in rebuttal,2 ' the statute is
unconstitutional; whereas, identical statutes have been held valid
when requiring a nmens rea.22
There is another type of legislation, not related to the foregoing
group of crimes, condemning the obtaining of property by false pre-
tenses and cheats, the purpose of which is to discourage overdrafts,
check kiting, and generally to avert the mischief to trade and com-
merce which the circulation of worthless checks inflicts. This legis-
lation is generally known as the "Worthless Check Acts" and may
be divided into two classes, viz., those requiring an "intent to de-
Refusing to pay money decreed for support of husband: Livingston v. Su-
perior Court, 117 Cal. 633, 49 Pac. 836, 38 L. R. A. 175 (1897).
Refusing to pay money decr-eed for support of minor child: Fussel v. S.,
166 N. W. 197 (Neb. 1918).
Obtaining lodging, etc. by fraud: S. v. Barbee, 187 N. C. 703 (1924) ; Smith
v. S., 141 Ga. 482, 81 S. E. 220, Ann. Cas. 1915c, p. 999 (1914); Ex parte
Milecke, 52 Wash. 312, 100 Pac. 743, 21 L. R. A. (n. s.) 259, and note (1909).
Removing baggage subject to lien for unpaid bills: S. v. Engle, 156 Ind. 339,
58 N. E. 698 (1900).
Refusing to pay taxes: S. v. Widman, 72 So. 782 (Miss. 1916).
Libel: Moore v. Green, 73 N. C. 394, 21 Am. Rep. 470 (1875).
Fines and cost for violating criminal law: S. v. Manuel, supra note 10;
S. v. Wallin, 89 N. C. 578 (1883). Although at common law fines were a
proper subject for an action of "debt.'
But penalty for violating municipal ordinances is a debt: Board of Educa-
tion v. Henderson, 126 N. C. 689, 35 S. E. 228 (1900).
" N. C. Cons. Stat. 4277 et seq.; 33 Hen. VIII, c. 1, §§ 1 & 2; 30 Geo. II, c.
24, § 1.
" N. C. Cons. Stat. 4283; 3 N. C. L. Rev. 141 (1925).
"8S. v. Mangum, 116 N. C. 998 (1895) ; S. v. Davis, 150 N. C. 851 (1909)
S. v. Matthews, 121 N. C. 604 (1897) ; S. v. Phifer, 65 N. C. 321 (1871). But
no crime where defrauded party knew of fraud or ought to have known it. S.
v. Moore, 111 N. C. 667 (1892) ; S. v. Whedbee, 152 N. C. 770 (1910).
" S. v. Freeman, 172 N. C. 925 (1916).
"S. v. Williams, 150 N. C. 802, 63 S. E. 949 (1909) ; Minton v. Early, 183
N. C. 199, 111 S. E. 347 (1922) ; Ex parte Hollman, 79 S. C. 9, 60 S. E. 19,
21 L. R. A. (n. s.) 242, and note (1908).
' Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 31 Sup. Ct. 145, 55 L. Ed. 191 (1911).
S. v. Norman, 110 N. C. 484, 14 S. E. 968 (1892); Ledford v. Emerson,
supra, note 14; Ex parte Riley, 94 Ala. 82, 10 So. 528 (1892) ; S. v. Vann, 150
Ala. 66, 43 S. E. 357 (1907) ; Lamar v. S., 120 Ga. 312, 47 S. E. 958 (1904);
Banks v. S., 124 Ga. 15, 52 S. E. 74, 2 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1007 (1905).
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fraud,"2 3 which constitute the majority of such statutes, 24 and those
penalizing the giving of such checks without expressly requiring such
intent. Where such intent is required the courts uphold the consti-
tutionality of the statute on the ground that the imprisonment is not
for mere non-payment of debt but for practicing the fraud specified
therein.2 5 Some jurisdictions support the statute on the theory that
the offense is not connected with debt, but consists in resorting to a
practice which the legislature regarded as demoralizing to business
and the penalizing of such practices as a valid exercise of police
power.26 Other jurisdictions hold that unless the statute requires
such an intent, it is invalid as in contravention of the constitutional
provision against imprisonment for debt; in which cases the courts
construe the requisite intent into the statute. 27
The North Carolina worthless check legislation began with an
orthodox fraud statute,23 and was later supplemented by a non-fraud
statute,29 imposing conditional criminal liability, which evolved into
the present non-fraud criminal statute. 80 The present statute does
not require a fraudulent intent, nor the obtaining of credit or prop-
erty, nor does it allow days of grace. And in this respect the North
Carolina law differs from the great majority of American worthless
These statutes would appear at first glance to be identical with those
against obtaining property by false pretenses. But the present statutes are more
comprehensive in that they would include any kind of fraud, such as giving a
worthless check to secure a delay while debtor absconds with his property.
2States not requiring such fraudulent intent as an element of the offense
are: North Carolina, North Dakota; also the following which allow days of
grace: Arkansas, Iowa, Mississippi, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia
and Kansas, the latter allowing an abatement of the action upon showing an
account within 30 days.
I Hollis v. S., 152 Ga. 182, 108 S. E. 783 (1921) ; S. v. Alphonse, 154 La.
950, 98 So. 430 (1923) ; Commonwealth v. McCall, 186 Ky. 301, 217 S. W. 109(1919); S. v. Pilling, 53 Wash. 464, 102 Pac. 203, 132 Am. St. Rep. 1080
(1909) ; S. v. Meeks, 247 Pac. 1099 (Ariz. 1926).
IS. v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 207 Pac. 838, 23 A. L. R. 453 (1922) ; S. v.
Yarboro, supra, note 1.
I Neidlinger v. S., 17 Ga. App. 811, 88 S. E. 687, 23 A. L. P. 459 (1916),
in which the court said that to construe the statute otherwise, "the act would
be in effect nothing more than a means of enforcing promises and other civil
obligations, and of collecting debts by the processes of the criminal law-which
is utterly abhorrent to our public policy as announced by the courts and as
embodied in the Constitution of our state." (Case criticized in S. v. Avery,
supra, note 26.)
The Georgia legislature has since expressly incorporated into the statute
the words, "with intent to defraud," Ga. L. 1919, p. 220.
'N. C. Cons. Stat. 4283, P. L. 1907, amended 1909.
N. C. P. L. 1925, c. 4; 5 N. C. L. Rev. 75 (1926) ; 6 N. C. L. Rev. 179
(1925); S. v. Edwards, 190 N. C. 322, 130 S. E. 10 (1925); S. v. Corpening,
191 N. C. 751, 133 S. E. 14 (1926).0N. C. P. L. 1927, c. 62.
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check laws.31 The statute penalizes the purported payment of a
past due obligation without regard to fraudulent intent or detri-
ment to the payee.
The constitutionality of the statute was supported in the instant
case by a three to two decision, with each member of the court
writing a separate opinion. The majority of the court base their
argument on the theory that giving a worthless check is an offense
entirely distinct from the debt. But apparently desiring to strengthen
their position, they supplemented this argument by assuming that
the giving of such a check is in effect a fraud, thereby confusing
two distinct theories in support of the statute.32
The instant case did not involve the question of post-dated
checks, so it is interesting to note their probable status under the
present act. According to the rules of statutory construction, they
are clearly included by implication. The present statute makes no
reference to post-dated checks, whereas the prior statute expressly
excepted them.33 Further the term "draft" would perhaps include
such checks.3 4 The courts have divided on the question of whether a
fraudulent intent is controlling on the applicability of the statute to
post-dated checks. 85 However, the specific evils which the statute
Supra, note 24.
'The three majority opinions do not clearly distinguish between the two
theories, nor state which of the two they adopt; i.e., whether giving the check
is a criminal act entirely separate from debt, or whether giving a check with-
out sufficient funds is a false representation and hence without constitutional
protection. The theories are distinctive, in fact antithetic, and obviously the
act cannot be both. It would appear that the opinions incline toward different
views.
Lewis', Sutherland Statutory Construction (second Ed.), Vol. I, p. 521.
'8 C. J. 106, § 192.
Post-dated checks where statute requires an intent to defraud. Post-dated
checks included: People v. Bercovitz, 163 Cal. 636, 126 Pac. 479, 43 L. R. A.
(n.s.) 667 (1912) ; Commonwealth v. Woolis, 15 Del. Co. Rep. 549 (Pa. Quar.
Sess., Blair Co., 1921) ; People v. Westerdahl, 316 Ill. 86, 146 N. E. 737 (1925).
Contra: S. v. Barone, 118 Att. 779 (N. J. 1922) ; Territory v. Forrest, 26
Hawaii 695 (1923). Cf. S. v. Winter, 98 S. C. 294, 82 S. E. 419 (1914).
Post-dated checks where intent to defraud is not required. Post-dated checks
included: S. v. Avery, supra, note 26; S. v. Johnson, 116 Kan. 390, 226 Pac.
758 (1924). Contra: Lovell v. Eaton, 133 Atl. 742 (Vt 1925) ; Smith v. S.,
147 Ark. 49, 226 S. W. 531 (1921).
Telling payee that there are no present funds, prevents applicability of
statute to post-dated checks: Neidlinger v. S., supra, note 27; Strickland v. S.,
27,Ga. App. 772, 110 S. E. 39 (1921); White v. S., 27 Ga. App. 774, 110 S. E.
40 (1921) ; People v. Wilkins, 67 Cal. App. 758, 228 Pac. 367 (1924) ; Ex parte
Griffin, 257 Pac. 458 (Cal. 1927). Statutes against obtaining property by false
pretenses do not include post-dated checks: Brown v. S., 166 Ind. 85, 76 N. E.
881 (1906) ; S. v. Ferris, 171 Ind. 562, 86 N. E. 993 (1909) ; 34 W. Va. L. Q.
207, 208 (1928).
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was designed to remedy follow from the giving of a worthless post-
dated check regardless of the intent. But, nevertheless, the court
may hold the statute inapplicable to such checks because of the un-
favorable and far reaching results, on the basis that to include them
would be to render an act which was intended to subserve a useful
purpose unconstitutional and void.3 6 Yet to exclude post-dated
checks would be in practical effect to render the statute ineffectual,
because it would be easy to escape liability by.dating all checks one
day ahead.8 7
The question now arises, is the decision in the instant case sound?
If the constitutionality of the statute is admitted, the result natur-
ally follows. But in the present case the court was faced with an
easy problem and it was relatively simple to uphold the statute. The
evils incident to promiscuous circulation of worthless paper are gen-
erally recognized, and the court is likely to feel instinctively that
such a statute should be upheld. It then finds itself forced to resort
to highly technical reasoning to support its decision. The majority
opinions say that the constitutional prohibition is inapplicable be-
cause it is not imprisonment for debt at all, but rather imprisonment
for uttering a worthless check. However, the court admits that the
purpose of the constitutional provision was to abolish the evils of
the capias ad satisfaciendum. If this statute even partially restores
those evils, then it is unconstitutional within the spirit if not the letter
of the constitution.38 Under the spirit of the constitution the state
"'A person could give a check dated three months in advance, having no
funds at present, be guilty of a crime under the statute, be convicted, serve his
term, yet have money on deposit to honor the check upon its due date.
' 6 N. C. L. Rev. 181 (1928).
,' Imprisonment for debt of Col. Wm. Barton (who captured the British
General Prescott, July 10, 1777), drew from Whittier his fine poem, "The
Prisoner for Debt"; in which the poet exclaims,
"What has the gray-haired prisoner done?
Has murder stained his hands with gore?
Not so; his crime's a fouler one;
God made the old man poor !
Down with the law that binds him thus!
Unworthy freemen, let it find
No refuge from the withering curse
Of God and hunman-kind!
Open the prison's living tomb,
And uzher from its brooding gloom
The victims of your savage code
To the free sun and air of God;
No longer dare as crime to brand
The chastening of the Almighty's hand."
NOTES
may impose -imprisonment as a punishment for fraud, but it may not
imprison one man for failing to pay his debt to another by punishing
him as a criminal if he makes an improvident and futile attempt.
Under our present statute the debtor's predicament in some cases
is worse than before the abolition of imprisonment for debt, when
he in effect held the keys to the prison in his possession, and could
take advantage of the insolvent debtor's oath to escape confinement.
But today a creditor need only coerce or beguile his innocent debtor,
unversed in the technicalities of the law, to give him a check as pur-
ported payment of his debt, or merely as evidence of the indebted-
ness, and thereby invoke the aid of the criminal courts in collecting
the account,3 9 and there is no "open-sesame" to the prison doors.
It is further reasoned that the mere giving of a worthless check
or draft is a fraud, because there is a false representation of a fact
which the giver might have ascertained, and that therefore the im-
prisonment is in fact for fraud, and hence expressly excepted from
the protection of the constitution. The position is questionable, be-
cause in order to constitute actionable fraud the following facts must
appear: (1) That there were false representations of a subsisting
material fact,40 (2) that they were intended to deceive, (3) that they
did deceive, and (4) that damage followed proximately the decep-
tion. 41 The offense under the present statute is fatally lacking in
some of these essential elements because there need be no fraudulent
intent, nor need damage result,42 and finally, as a matter of evidence,
the fact of fraud need not be alleged and proved. 43 Hence if the
statute is to be supported on the ground that it penalizes fraud, the
North Carolina court would have had less difficulty in reaching this
conclusion if it had followed the Georgia court and construed an
intent to defraud into the statute.
A. L. BUTLER.
The prosecuting attorneys in some districts refuse to prosecute such
actions on the ground that it is degrading the criminal courts by converting
them into collecting agencies.
" Making an untruthful representation (as the giving of a worthless check)
is not of itself fraudulent; it must be accompanied by a fraudulent intent, 12
R. C. L. 239, 241. But the court apparently disregards the other elements of
the offense.
" Cooley, Torts, p. 475 and citations.
"For actionable fraud damage must result: Carpenter Paper Co. v. News
Pub. Co., 63 Neb. 59, 87 N. W. 1050, 1051 (1901) ; Hodges v. Coleman, 76 Ala.
103 (1884) ; Cooley, Torts, p. 62 and citations.
" Fraud not a presumption, but a fact to be proved: Shafer v. Shafer et al.,
85 Md. 554, 37 Atl. 167, 169 (1897) ; Words and Phrases, Vol. 3, "Fraud," p.
2946.
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EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF PROPERTY
Equitable restrictions in the narrow sense of the phrase are re-
strictions enforceable only on equitable principles. If recorded the
right involved is as binding against otherwise bona fide purchasern
as any legal property interest as far as notice is concerned.' And it
is enough to bind a purchaser of the res if the restrictions are con-
tained in a recorded deed through which he derived title.2 So as
the law stands parties creating equitable restrictions may make them
as binding as a legal right subject to an exception to be noted.3 As
here considered equitable restrictions are restrictions binding on the
property subject thereto and not mere personal obligations.
No particular form of provision or stipulation is essential to
the creation of equitable restrictions. They may appear in the form
of covenants 4 or simple contracts,5 reservations6 or conditions. 7 It
has been held that such restrictions may be imposed upon property
by a verbal reference to a building scheme.8 But if the right created
is to be deemed an interest in real property a writing is necessary
to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Accordingly it has been held in
North Carolina that the agreement creating the restrictions must be
in writing,9 which, it is thought, is the better opinion.' 0 Unless the
intent of the parties is clear the binding force of the restrictions is
necessarily left to judicial construction. That result is the more
undesirable when considered with the fact that the parties to the
restrictive agreement might easily provide that the burden and the
benefit be annexed to the respective res into whosoever hands they
should pass."
'Ames, Specific Performance for and against Strangers to the Contract
(1903), 17 Harv. L. Rev. 174.
'Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546 (1876).
' See infra note 6. The exception suggested is the rule that equitable re-
strictions will not be specifically enforced where there has been such a change
in the character of the neighborhood as to defeat their purpose and render it
inequitable to grant such relief. On this point note the searching analysis of
the authorities by Brogden, J. in Starkey v. Gardner, 194 N. C. 74 (1927).
"Francis v. Ziering, 112 N. Y. Supp. 647 (1908).
'Dorr v. Harrigan, 101 Mass. 531 (1869).
'Peck v. Conway, supra, note 2.
'Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen (Mass.) 341 (1863); Ayling v. Kramer,
133 Mass. 12 (1882) ; 16 Mich. L. Rev. 99.
'Tallmadge v. Bank, 26 N. Y. 105 (1862).
'Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589, 127 S. E. 697 (1925).
" This point will hardly be much-agitated because it is simply more practical
and suitable to the purpose to create the restrictions by a writing, as in a deed
of property or under a building plan, either of which may be recorded.
"Rogers v. Hosegood (1900), 2 Ch. 388. If the intention of the parties is
not clear "the ownership and character of buildings in the neighborhood, plans,
NOTES
Real property, businesses, and even chattels have been made the
subjects of equitable restrictions. As to real property no comment
is necessary here. The benefit 12 of equitable restrictions may be
annexed to a business and it would seem that the same is true of the
burden.' 3 One eminent writer explains this result as an application
of the equitable principle 'that the incident will pass with the prin-
cipal thing without any formal assignment."' 4 That is a good
analysis of the running of the benefit and the same reasoning may
be applied to the case where the burden is on the business, aside from
the objection that there should be a dominant tenement, hereinafter
discussed.
Equitable restrictions have been upheld as to personalty in the
case of patents and copyrights. 15 The monopolistic nature of such
interests, however, distinguishes them in this regard from ordinary
chattels. There is no reason for allowing such restraints upon the
latter. As to them there is usually no such legitimately peculiar
interests to protect. It follows that restrictive agreements as to
chattel property should not be enforced in the same manner as equi-
table restrictions on realty.
In England equity will enforce a restrictive agreement as to real
estate as against persons other than the parties thereto "only when
it is restrictive of the use of the land."'16 The English rule has been
building schemes, the existence of similar restrictions upon other lots, even
parol agreements among neighbors may be shown as bearing upon the probable
intention of the contracting parties." 5 Harv. L. Rev. 278, cited in 16 Mich.
L. Rev. 100.
'John Bros. Abergarzw Brewery Co. v. Holmes (1900), 1 Ch. 188; Fran-
cisco v. Smith, 143 N. Y. 488, 38 N. E. 980 (1894). See also 24 Harv. L.
Rev. 574.
24 Harv. L. Rev. 575.
" Pound, Progress of the Law (1919), 33 Harv. L. Rev. 813. At page 819
the writer says: "There is no more than a personal claim against covenantor,
but that claim is an incident of the business and will pass therewith because its
purpose and intent can only be carried out in that way and equity looks to
that as the substance and not to its form." In Rosen v. Wolff, 152 Ga. 578,
110 S. E. 877 (1922), it was said that the equity of one seeking to enforce a
restrictive covenant in favor of a business was based upon privity of con-
science, citing 31 Yale L. Jour. 131.
'Murphey v. Christian Press Publishing Co., 38 App. Div. 426, 56 N. Y.
Supp. 597 (1899). The court enforced the restrictions on the analogy of so-
called negative easements in real property. Contra: Garst v. Hall & Lyon Co.,
179 Mass. 588, 61 N. E. 219 (1901), where it was held that an agreement not
to resell a patent medicine for less than a price fixed by the manufacturer
bound only the purchaser who was a party thereto. The same result has been,
reached by the United States Supreme Court on the ground, however, that
under the patent laws an attempt by a manufacturer to fix the resale price was
futile. Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1 (1912).162 Tiffany, Real Property 1428, and cases cited.
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applied with approval in New York.117 However, there is good
American authority to the effect that the principles of equitable
servitudes extend to affirmative as well as restrictive agreements.1 8
It has been suggested that in such cases enforcement is either granted
or refused according to the principles of specific performance. 19
That is not entirely acceptable, however, if we take the interest in-
volved to be a property right. 20 Like many other property rights
it is created by contract, making it none the less an interest surviving
apart from the contract of its creation. The rules of specific per-
formance of contracts are no more applicable than in the protection
of other equitable property rights such as an equitable charge, for
example. The courts generally do not accept that conclusion.2 1 There
are properly more limitations upon the creation and enforcement of
servitudes requiring affirmative acts than is true of restrictive ones
because they more seriously affect the alienability of the servient
res and their protection is more repugnant to personal liberty.2 2
May there be equitable restrictions in gross, or in other words,
where the burden attaches to the servient tenement and the benefit
is merely personal without any dominant tenement? It has already
been suggested that such might be so where the servient res was a
business. In theory this is a perfectly valid concept because an
equitable servitude is not an easement but a flexible property right
of equitable nature.23 Practically it would be difficult to get a court
"Miller v. Clary, 210 N. Y. 127, 103 N. E. 1114 (1913).
3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 1295, cited approvingly in Sharp v.
Cheathan, 88 Mo. 498, 57 Am. Rep. 433 (1885). That court said: "There
would seem to be but little of either justice or sound reason in the doctrine
which enforces the equities arising from the agreement of parties to refrain
from doing certain acts toward a certain subject-matter, and yet refuse to
enforce a similar agreement by compelling the performance of acts embraced
within its terms."
"Any agreement that equity will enforce between the contracting parties
will equally be enforced as a restriction against the purchaser of the land." 5
Harv. L. Rev. 277.
"Clark, Principles of Equity 109.
' Windemere-Grand Improvement and Protective ASs'n. v. Bank, 205
Mich. 539, 172 N. W. 29 (1919).
"Here there is truly a suggestion of considerations involved in specific
enforcement of contracts. Equity may refuse specific performance of an
affirmative contract where the difficulties in the way of effectually enforcing
performance are great or there will be undesirable interference with the de-
fendant's personal liberty.
' It is true that one must have an interest in the enforcement of the restric-
tions to be entitled to the assistance of equity but why has not a party such an
interest when he transfers his land subject to restrictions, thereby reserving
that much of the total property interest in the land, which interest he is entitled
to have protected?
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of equity to enforce such an interest because the primary purpose
of equitable restriction is to protect or make more beneficial other
property. Yet, according to the decisions, where there is a dominant
tenement the tenant in possession may have the protection of equity
without showing actual damages. Prof. Clark cites an Illinois case
as an example of the enforcement of equitable restrictions in gross. 24
This well-reasoned opinion is not in accord with the weight of
authority.2 5 The English rule also requires a dominant tenement.20
There has been no decision on the point in North Carolina, but since
the North Carolina court regards equitable restrictions as negative
easements it seems that it would probably follow this latter view. 27
The parties who may enforce equitable restrictions may be classi-
fied as follows :28
1. Transferees of property retained by convenantees to which
the benefit has attached. 29
2. The owners of land involved in mutual restrictive agree-
ments.8 0
3. The grantee and his grantees of real property for the benefit
of which the original grantor made a restrictive agreement with
reference to the realty retained by him.3 1
4. The several owners of lots sold under a general building
scheme or plan.32 Here the restrictions are enforceable by the own-
ers of any lot against the owner of any other lot.
' Van Sant v. Rose, 170 Ill. App. 572, 103 N. E. 194 (1912) discussed in
Clark, Principles of Equity 125. Clark suggests that the Illinois court gave
relief on the theory of preventing unjust enrichment. Rather, however, the
court held that the vendor who required the execution of the covenants thereby
reserved an interest that he was entitled to have protected independently of the
existence or non-existence of a dominant tenement.
' "A court of equity will not enforce a restrictive covenant assigned unless
the effect of the enforcement of the restrictive covenant will be to protect
property held by the complainant at the same time of the suit." Radio Corp. of
America v. De Forest Radio Telep. and Teleg. Co., 127 Ati. 678 (N. J.) (1925).
I confess that I do not see the logic of this result.
' London County Council v. Allen (1914), 3 K. B. 642.
" Davis v. Robinson, supra note 9.
' We are not here concerned with parties in legal privity as to the restrictive
agreement. In such case legal remedies are open to the parties.
Hemsley v. Marlborough Hotel Co., 62 N. J. Eq. 164, 50 Atl. 14 (1901).
Codman v. Bradley, 201 Mass. 361, 87 N. E. 591 (1909).
'Nicoll v. Fenning, 1 Ch. D. 258 (1881); Rosen v. Wolff, supra note 14;
Brown v. Huber, 80 Ohio St. 183, 88 N. E. 322 (1909).
a'Johnston v. Garrett, 190 N. C. 835, 130 S. E. 835 (1925). Difficulty has
been encountered in finding a satisfactory theory of enforcement to sustain the
case where a subsequent purchaser under a general plan is allowed to enforce
the restrictions against a former one. The simplest explanation is that the
burden and benefit extend to the whole subdivision at the outset so that a
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5. The owners of real property never owned by the grantor but
intended to be benefited by the restrictions imposed on the land
transferred.83
In general the right of persons other than the original coven-
antee to enforce the restrictions depends upon whether the parties
to the restrictive agreement intended to benefit the property now held
by them and not simply the covenantee personally.84 So one seeking
to enforce the restrictions must show that his property was intended
to be benefited.35 That intent, if not apparent, is found from a
construction of the agreement in connection with all the circum-
stances surrounding its execution. 86 It is settled that the construc-
tion most unfavorable to the dominant owner will be adopted because
the law favors the free use and full ownership of property.87
The benefit of an equitable servitude may be annexed to an equi-
table estate.88 The holder in possession of the particular estate may
enforce the servitude without showing any damages, 39 but a re-
mainderman must show actual injury to his interest to get relief in
equity.40 A tenant for years may enforce the servitude.41
In England it has been held that a covenantee for whom alone
the benefit was originally intended, where the power to do so was
conferred by the agreement, might annex the benefit to the land in
a subsequent transfer thereof.42 That doctrine has not been adopted
in this country.43 Though under a general building scheme the re-
strictions are enforceable inter-lot, they are not enforceable intra-lot,
subsequent purchaser simply buys land to which the benefit is already annexed.
In this connection see McKenzie v. Childers, 43 Ch. D. 265 (1888) and 19 Col.
L. Rev. 187.
SHays v. St. Paul M. E. Church, 196 II. 633, 63 N. E. 1040 (1902).
"Berryman v. Hotel Savoy Co., 160 Cal. 559, 116 Pac. 677, 37 L. R. A. (N.
.S.) 5 (1911).
' McNicholl v. Townsend, 73 N. J. Eq. 76, 67 AUt. 938 (1907).
"Hays v. St. Paul Church, supra note 33; see also note 11, supra.
"Marsh v. Marsh, 90 N. J. Eq. 244, 106 Aft. 810 (1919).
'Rogers v. Hosegood, supra note 11.
'Lord Manners v. Johnson, 1 Ch. D. 673 (1875) ; Van Sant v. Rose, supra
-note 24.
"Johnstone v. Hall, 2 Kay and Johnson 414 (1856).
"Johnson v. Robertson, 156 Iowa 64, 135 N. W. 585 (1912). Here a tenant
for years was allowed to enforce the servitude on the theory that the restrictive
agreement created an equitable servitude enforceable by anyone interested in
the property. See also Taite v. Gosling, 11 Ch. D. 273 (1879).
"Renals v. Cowlishaw, 9 Ch. D. 125 (1876) ; Chambers v. Randall (1923),
1 Ch. 149.
"That it has no virtue for either the covenantor or covenantee has been
-conclusively demonstrated by Dean Ames. See 17 Harv. L. Rev. 174.
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that is, by the several owners of parts of a single lot that has been
subdivided, as against each other. 4
In general, those who may claim the benefit must have an interest
in the dominant tenement,4 5 but a mere occupant may be bound who
has no interest in the servient tenement.48 "The burden of the
restrictive agreement, unless expressly limited to the covenantor, falls
upon every possessor of the res except a purchaser for value without
notice of the agreement, or a possessor subsequent to such a bona
fide purchaser.147 Notice is required, of course, because transfer
to a bona fide purchaser cuts off equities. It is sufficient notice if
the restrictive agreement is recorded in the line of title of the party
to be bound.48 It has been held in North Carolina that to bind sub-
sequent purchasers of the servient tenement the restrictive agree-
ment must be recorded.4 9
Equitable restrictions may be discharged in the following ways:
1-By release.50  2-Purchase of the servient tenement by a bona
fide purchaser without notice. 3-Changes in the character of
the neighborhood defeating the purpose of the restrictions. 51
4-Laches.52  5-Implied waiver by the party owning the benefit
either by acquiescence in defendant's breach or by his own breach of
the restrictions.53  6-Condemnation under eminent domain. 54
" King v. Dickeson, 40 Ch. D. 596 (1889). The lot subdivided is subject
in all its parts to the original restrictions but subdividing does not create any
mutual restrictions among the several parts.
" Johnson v. Robertson, supra note 41.
"Mander v. Falcke (1891), 2 Ch. 554.
41 17 Harv. L. Rev. 177. An adverse possessor would be bound even though
the statutory period had run as to the land. In re Nisbet (1906), 1 Ch. 386.
"Peck v. Conway, supra note 2.
"Davis v. Robinson, supra note 9. And under the North Carolina record-
ing act no notice will take the place of registration. Fertilizer C. v. Lane, 173
N. C. 184, 91 S. E. 953 (1917). On the other hand it has been held that a sign
on property sold with the words: "this is Morningside, exclusive residential
section, with adequate restrictions" bound the purchaser so that he could not
erect a business structure on the premises. Raven v. Laurens, 139 S. E. (Ga.)
546 (1927).
'Myers Park Homes C. v. Fall, 184 N. C. 426, 115 S. E. 184 (1922).
"Starkey v. Gardner, supra note 3; Windentere-Grand Assn. v. Bank, supra
note 21; Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 31 N. E. 691 (1891).
' Orne v. Fridenberg, 143 Pa. 487, 22 Atl. 832 (1891). Simply delaying to
sue should not per se preclude the plaintiff. The analogy of the Statute of
Limitations should be followed here so far as consistent with the equities
beiween the parties.
"' 74 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 314 and cases cited. Unless it appears that a party
by violating the restrictions himself intended to waive their benefit it is doubt-
ful whether the courts should raise an implied waiver. That is true because
the fact that A violates a right that B has in his land is no conclusive reason
for saying that he waives similar rights that he owns in B's land. The courts
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Although the whole subject of equitable servitude is perplexingly
confused, probably the most confusion has arisen in the-matter of
explaining their nature. Their development is generally regarded as
a piece of judicial legislation beginning with the English case of
Tulk v. Moshay in 1848.55 The theory of that case, enforcement
to prevent against enrichment, has been definitely rejected, as shown
by the holding that one who buys the dominant tenement without
notice of the restrictions may have the benefit.5 6 Again they have
been treated as covenants running with the land and as negative
easements.57 The North Carolina Court has on one occasion termed
them the former 58 and on another the latter.5 9 Neither analogy is
entirely adequate. For instance covenants running with the land are
not enforceable where privity of estate is wanting and neither such
covenants nor easements are applicable to personalty as equitable
servitudes may be. 0° Dean Ames leans to the constructive trust
theory announced in 5 Harv. L. Rev. 274 in explaining the running
of the burden.
It has been assumed throughout by the writer that an equitable
restriction or servitude is a property interest.0 1 Again it is an
equitable interest having a character of its own not at all dependent
upon convenient analogies. It is a distinct type of property interest,
the product of modern Anglo-American, urban economic life. The
most recent development in the regulation of city growth is away
from this individual private method toward public regulations by
adhere too closely to principles of specific performance of contracts in these
cases with a minimum of emphasis upon the fact that they are dealing with
property rights.
' Note 61, infra.
2 Phillips 774.
'Clark, Principles of Equity 117-118; Rogers v. Hosegood, supra, note 11.
"London and Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Goinm, L. R. 20 Ch. D. 562, 583
(1882).
'4Johnston v. Garrett, supra note 32.
" Davis v. Robinson, supra note 9.
'17 Harv. L. Rev. 182. The writer fully states the weaknesses in the
analogies considered.
Two significant cases may be mentioned in support of this position. In
Flynn v. R. R., 218 N. Y. 140, 112 N. E. 913 (1916) it was held that the viola-
tion of equitable restrictions by a railroad for its corporate purposes amounted
to a taking of private property for which compensation must be made or a
perpetual injunction would issue. In Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.
W. 317, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 890 (1911) it was held that a city which bought
property subject to equitable restrictions could not erect buildings thereon in
violation of the restrictions without first purchasing the property right involved
or condemning it for public purposes. For the view that it is not a property
right see Wilson Co. v. Gordon, 224 S. W. (Tex.) 703 (1920).
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zoning under the police power,62 a subject beyond the scope of this
note.
J. B. FORDHAM.
IMPEACHMENT OF A VERDICT BY AFFIDAVIT OR TESTIMONY
OF A JUROR
It has long been settled law in North Carolina that a verdict of
the jury may not be impeached by an affidavit or testimony of one
of the jurors.' In the early eighteenth century a verdict might have
been impeached by such testimony, but in 1785 Lord Mansfield laid
down the doctrine that a verdict might not be so impeached.2 This
doctrine became more fully established in the English law by a full
expression of the view given by a later Mansfield in 1807.3
Since the first adoption of this doctrine our Court has affirmed
it on numerous occasions. The cases of this kind seem to fall into
three divisions or classifications. The first of these applies to mis-
takes in deliberation, which includes misapplying the judge's charge
and misapplying the evidence.4 All courts which have adopted the
Mansfield view refuse to admit affidavits in such instances. The
second and most common of the divisions refers to misconduct of the
jury. This division includes such things as bribery, undue influence,
and conveying private information in the jury room by one of the
jurors.5 Here also our Court in rejecting the juror's impeaching
'Van Hecke, Zoning Ordinances and Restrictions in Deeds (1928), 37 Yale
L. Journ. 407.
'Suttrell's Executors v. Dry's Executors, 5 N. C. 94 (1805).
2 Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T. R. 11, K. B. (1785).
'Owen v. Warburton, 1 B. & P. N. R. 326, 329 (1807).
"Bellamy v. Pippin, 74 N. C. 46 (1876) (jury did not consider all of the
evidence in finding damages) ; State v. Smallwood, 78 N. C. 560 (1878)(verdict by compromise) ; State v. Royal, 90 N. C. 755 (1884) (certain person
who the jurors thought should have testified did not do so and this caused them
to arrive at a different verdict) ; Jones v. Parker, 97 N. C. 33, 2 S. E. 370(1887) (misunderstood the charge); Johnson v. Allen, 100 N. C. 131, 141, 5,
S. E. 666 (1888) (method of arriving at damages) ; Purcell v. Railroad, 119
N. C. 728, 26 S. E. 161 (1896) (quotient verdict); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.
S. 264, 35 Sup. Ct. 783 (1915) (quotient. verdict).
S'State v. McLeod, 8 N. C. 344 (1821) (misconduct) ; State v. Tilghman, 33N. C. 513 (1850) (misconduct was shown but not by affidavits which was held
good for a new trial but not a mis-trial)-Love v. Moody, 68 N. C. 200 (1873)
(affidavit admitted with that of an attorney to show tampering) ; State v.
Brittain, 89 N. C. 481, 504 (1883) (undue influence) ; Lafoon v. Shearin, 95
N. C. 391, 394 (1886) (conveying information in the jury room by one of thejurors) ; State v. Harper, 101 N. C. 761, 7 S. E. 730 (1888). (Improper ap-
proach-wrong officer in charge-officer present at deliberations); State v.
Hall, 181 N. C. 527, 106 S. E. 483 (1921) (misbehavior).
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affidavit holds with the other courts. The third division deals with
the absence of actual assent to the verdict and misrecording of the
verdict. 6 In this instance our Court has been more restrictive in
the past than have the other courts adopting the Mansfield view.
Other courts have not, as a general rule, gone this far; they have
excluded the testimony of the jurors as to the first two divisions but
have admitted such testimony in the case where the jurors did not
actually assent to the verdict rendered.
By the above line of cases it seems that the Mansfield view has
become firmly intrenched in our law. It appears, however, that the
Court has in one or two instances deviated slightly from the estab-
lished view. The Court has said that the setting aside of the verdict
is within the discretion of the judge.7 From this may it be inferred
that the judge may consider the affidavits~to see whether he would
be justified in setting aside the verdict? It may be that the affidavits
offered by jurors to impeach their verdict may not be received as
legal evidence of grounds for new trial as a matter of right, but that
they may raise a reasonable suspicion or doubt in the mind of the
judge so that he may in his discretion set aside the verdict. The
Court has made no actual statement of any such exception but the
language used by the Court might lead to such an inference.8
Practically all jurisdictions, there being a few exceptions,9 have
adopted the Mansfield view and it has become so firmly a part of
the law that it is very improbable that it would be repudiated by
judicial decision. The first statement of this generally accepted rule
was made by the Iowa Court in 1866.10 The view taken by the
Iowa Court is the same as that adopted by Wigmore in his work on
Evidence. 1 This modification receives authorization as an analogy
to the well-known Parol Evidence Rule. In applying that rule of
evidence the verdict is taken as an act done, whether the verdict be a
0Suttrell's Executors v. Dry's Executors, 5 N. C. 94 (1805) (did not assent
to the verdict) ; State v. Smallwood, 78 N. C. 560 (1878) (did not assent to
result of verdict) ; Jones v. Parker, 97 N. C. 33, 2 S. E. 370 (1887) (did not
concur in the. verdict but misunderstanding charge probably controlling ele-
ment) ; State v. Best, 111 N. C. 638, 15 S. E. 930 (1892) (agreed to verdict
through a misuniderstanding of the result of the verdict) ; Miller v. Bank, 176
N. C. 152, 155, 96 S. E. 977 (1918) (intended to find a different verdict).
'Miller v. Bank, 176 N. C. 152, 155, 96 S. E. 977 (1918).
'Miller v. Bank, 176 N. C. 152, 155, 96 S, E. 977 (1918).
*t6iva' (perhaps), Kansas, Nebraska (perhaps), Ohio (perhaps), Tennes-
see, Texas (statutory), and Federal Courts.
Wright v. Telegraph Cd., 20 Iowa 195, 210 (1866).
Wigrhore; Evidence, pages 103 to 146.
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written one or not. No evidence may be taken to modify this act
done, but it is competent to show that the act was not the will of the
parties, the jurors, by reason of the absence of essential formalities-
the failure of the act to correspond with private intention, and also,
as in the case of deeds and contracts, fraud and other misconduct
invalidating the instrument, in this instance the verdict. This view
would still exclude the evidence offered by the jurors in the first
classification given above, that of mistakes in deliberation, but would
not exclude such evidence in the second and third divisions. Those
who contend for the Mansfield view say that to allow the introduc-
tion of the affidavits of the jurors would open the door to much
corruption and fraud. Yet the accepted rule allows the affidavit of
any person other than a juror to show that the verdict was improp-
erly arrived at 12 and this when the proceedings of the jury are
supposedly secret.
The North Carolina Court in a recent case' 3 breaks away to a
slight extent from its former holding. In this case, upon the polling
of the jury, a juror started to state that he did not concur in the
verdict but he stopped and then stated that he did assent to it. Later
he gave an affidavit that he did not understand that he could voice
any objections to the verdict, the judge not being present, and also
that he had voted for the verdict because all of the other jurors were
against him and because a mistrial is a great expense to the county.
The judge in the lower court accepted the affidavit and upon hearing
in the Supreme Court the order for a new trial given in the lower
court was affirmed. The Court said in regard to the acceptance of
the affidavit that it was not to impeach the verdict but was "explana-
tory" of it. The affidavit here would seem to come within the third
division above, that of the absence of actual assent to the verdict.
In this case the Court seems to be tending toward the more liberal
view of affidavits of jurors as regards verdicts and the view which
is adopted by the majority of the courts, as to the third division
pointed out above. The Court has not made a distinct break with
the Mansfield view and in fact states that the affidavit of a juror
may not be accepted to impeach a verdict, but certainly such action as
in this case 14 inclines toward the direction of the modified rule and
is not in exact harmony with the hard and fast ruling heretofore
adopted by our Court that in no event is the affidavit of a juror
acceptable. ANDREW C. McINTosH.
'Love v. Moody, 68 N. C. 200 (1873).
" In re Sugg, 194 N. C. 638 (1927).
"In re Sugg, 194 N. C. 638 (1927).
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MENTAL CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL
The question of mental capacity in connection with testamentary
disposition has sometimes been compared with capacity to make a
contract, and even with criminal capacity.' The contract analogy is
a closer one and has apparently been approved in some cases.2 Al-
though the two cases involve different factors, still capacity to dis-
pose of property at death and capacity to enter a legal transaction
have much in common. But criminal capacity, which is usually held
to involve the capacity to distinguish right from wrong, is decidedly
different.8
The question of the ability of the testator to understand the
nature and situation of his property and his relations to those around
him is considered of importance in determining whether he did or
did not have ability to make a will. If with reference to these things
he is able to understand what he is about, then that is sufficient.
Not infrequently it appears that a person has a delusion, or de-
lusions, with reference to a certain subject or subjects, but unless
this is of a kind to affect his property, it is usually held not to dis-
qualify.4 A delusion is a belief in a condition of affairs the existence
of which no rational person would believe. For instance, a person
might believe in spiritualism, or the doctrines of Swedenborg,5 and
still have ample ability to understand the management of his property
and his relations to those dependent upon him. However, he may
think so constantly and persistently upon such a subject as to become
a mono-maniac and, therefore, lacking in the necessary testamentary
power.
A great many of the cases in which wills have been contested
upon the ground of lack of testamentary capacity have also involved
the question of undue influence, and this may account for some con-
fusion in the cases where that element is not involved. Undue influ-
ence is a fraudulent influence,5* involving some element of coercion
and the substitution of one person's volition for another. Of course,
'Slaughter v. Heath, 127 Ga. 747, 57 S. E. 69 (1907).
'Mordecai, Law Lectures, 2d ed., p. 1240; Schouler, Wills, sec. 68.
'Page, Wills, sec. 94. In this connection see the views of the N. HE. and
Ala. courts in State v. Jones, 59 N. H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242 (1871) ; Parsons
v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 Son. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193 (1866).
" Ozven v. Crunbaugh, 228 Ill. 380, 81 N. E. 1044, 119 Am. State Rep. 442
(1907).
"Scott v. Scott, 212 Ill. 597, 72 N. E. 708.
"a Wingrove v. Wingrove, 11 P. D. 81. But undue does not mean improper,
Meyers v. Hanger, 98 Mo. 433, 11 S. W. 974.
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where a person is mentally weak, it is much easier to influence him,
but the test of his mental capacity is not, and should not be, affected
by this fact, unless there is evidence to prove there was an attempt
to persuade him to make a will different from what he would other-
wise have done. A person has testamentary capacity if he has a
clear understanding of the nature and extent of his act, of the kind
and value of the property devised, of the persons who are the natural
objects of his bounty, and of the manner in which he desires to dis-
pose of the property to be disposed of.6 If a person has sufficient
mentality, as determined by this test, he may make as many wills as
he chooses, changing the disposition of his property as often as he
sees fit. The question then arises as to the importance of consider-
ing such changes, in arriving at a conclusion upon the issue of
devisavit vel non.
In the case of the late Justice George H. Brown7 such a change
had been made. The testator had long considered the disposition of
his estate by will that he wished to make and, in fact, had made a
will accordingly, providing for his near blood relations. Shortly
before his death, however, he made another will, leaving out of con-
sideration these relations and giving his entire property to his wife.
Mr. A. D. McLean testified that his opinion that Judge Brown
was mentally incapable was based in part on a letter written by Judge
Brown before his alleged mental decline began. This letter showed
his original intention. The caveators insisted that it was important
for the jury to consider this, and the trial court permitted its intro-
duction in evidence and charged that in considering the caveators'
contentions "it is the right and duty of the jury . . . to con-
trast the two alleged wills as bearing on the issue of mental capacity."
The Supreme Court, on appeal by the propounder, affirmed by a
three to two decision the verdict of the jury against the last will,
thereby approving the introduction of the letter in evidence.
So far as the question of fact concerning the mental power of the
testator in this case is involved, it is clear that the jury felt that
they were bound to find from the evidence that Judge Brown's mental
condition toward the end of his life was not sufficient to meet the
test hereinbefore referred to, and the trial court instructed the jury
that the burden was on the caveators to show that he was not of
sound mind and disposing mentality at this time.
"In re Will of Creecy, 190 N. C. 301, 129 S. E. 822 (1925).1In re Brown, 194 N. C. 583, 140 S. E. 193 (1927).
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In reaching its conclusion the jury was doubtless influenced by a
comparison of the provisions of the two wills, as referred to in Judge
Brown's letter introduced in evidence. There are two possible ex-
planations of the change in disposition of property. One is that
Judge Brown simply decided that he would prefer for his widow to
have complete control of the disposition of his property after his
death; the other is that his mentality was failing, that he was sub-
ject to melancholia and hallucinations which led him to make a
change that he did not understand and really would not have made
if he had appreciated the true situation. The jury, doubtless, thought
it strange that a person of Judge Brown's keen mentality in the prime
of life should clearly show one settled and unvarying purpose as to
the disposition of his property by will, and then shortly before his
death make such a complete change without any satisfactory expla-
nation. Unquestionably, if undue influence had been involved, this
would have been a material factor7* and it is possible that there may
have been some confusion in the law applied, due to the fact as sug-
gested by Justice Brogden in his dissenting opinion,8 that in the
majority of cases undue influence and mental capacity were both
involved. This view would doubtless be correct if there has been no
other evidence except that concerning the two alleged wills, because
certainly neither the first nor the second bears within itself any
marks of lack of capacity. So it has been held that the amount and
disposition of the testator's property at the date of his will are not
alone pertinent questions to be considered ;9 but where there is other
evidence independent of this, is it not necessary for the jury, in order
to reach a correct conclusion and properly apply the test laid down,
to have an opportunity to compare the provisions.of both papers?P
'a In re Arnold, 147 Cal. 583, 82 Pac. 252; Love v. Johnston, 34 N. C. 355.
" 194 N. C. at p. 603.
*In re Storer's Will, 28 Minn. 9, 8 N. W. 827 (1881).
'a Hughes v. Hughes Executor, 31 Ala. 519 (1858) ; Hammond v. Dike, 42
Minn. 273, 44 N. W. 61, 18 Am. St. Rep. 503; Burrows v. Burrows, 1 Hagg.
109; Kerr v. Lunsford, 31 W. Va. 659, 8 S. E. 493, 2 L. R. A. 668. In the last
cited case the provisions of the two wills are similar and for the argument
that the rule should be the same where they are dissimilar, see especially
Hughes v. Hughes Executor, supra, at p. 524: "If the conformity tend to es-
tablish the will, does not the non-conformity tend to impair its validity ?"
Brown v. Mitchell, 88 Tex. 350, 31 S. W. 621, 36 L. R_ A. 64, sometimes citbd
as contra, turns largely upon the question of expert testimony. Also if the
lapse of time between the two papers has been too great, they are sometimes
excluded on that ground. Kimber v. Kimber (Ill. 1925), 148 N. E. 293 (5
yrs.). Care should be taken to distinguish between the sufficiency and adlpissi-
bility of such evidence and considerable discretion concerning admissibility
should be allowed the trial judge. Schouler, Wills (5 ed.) sec. 185, p. 210; also
